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Extended Abstract 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Auctions are well-studied mechanisms to solve 
decentralized resource allocation problems. In 
situations where complementarity exists among 
resources, combinatorial auctions may be utilized.  
Unfortunately, combinatorial auctions often incur hefty 
computational requirements, in that the underlying 
winner determination problem is known to be NP-hard. 
Although a number of efficient implementations are 
proposed (e.g., see Sandholm [11]), combinatorial 
auctions are still not very computationally efficient.  
To avoid solving winner determination problems, 
assuming that clearing is already feasible (i.e. 
aggregate resource demands could be met by supply), 
an alternative method for market clearing is the 
General Equilibrium or Walrasian model, first 
proposed by Walras [14].  Under the GE model, the 
auctioneer would not clear the auction and finalize the 
allocation. Instead, the auctioneer would adjust the 
prevailing resource prices based on the current 
aggregate demands induced by bidders against the 
supply, and announce the adjusted prices back to all 
agents. Reacting on the adjusted resource prices, the 
bidding agents generate the next set of bids and this 
process is iterated until either the supply and demand 
matches (i.e. general equilibrium is reached), or that 
the computational budget is exceeded. In a 
conventional Walrasian auction, bidders are assumed to 
be price takers meaning that they would view market 
prices as exogenous and not something that would 
change because of their own actions.  General 
equilibrium theory states that the market will converge 
to an equilibrium state under very restrictive conditions 
(such as gross substitutability). For arbitrary resource 
allocation problems however, the existence of such an 
equilibrium and effective means to find an equilibrium 
state is often a challenging research question.  
In this paper, we are concerned with solving 
decentralized resource allocation and scheduling 
problems; and assuming feasible solutions exist, we ask 
how we might achieve convergence and good quality 
solutions under a tight computational budget.  
Motivated by recent works on adaptive bidding 
strategies in a winner determination context (Sui and 
Leung [13]) and the analysis of bidding strategies for 
simultaneous ascending auctions in separate markets 
(Wellman et al. [16]), we propose an approach that 
departs from the standard Walrasian auction, in that the 
bidders are not merely price takers reacting to price 
signals; in addition, their bidding strategies can also be 
influenced by a negotiation mechanism, where they 
may adopt different bidding strategies from their 
respective strategy sets from one iteration to the next 
during the auction process.  In this sense, we say that 
the agents are “negotiable”.  We will show how a 
mechanism embedded in the auctioneer side detects a 
trigger state and persuades bidders to change their 
bidding strategies during the auction process, as well as 
how bidders respond to the solicitation of the 
auctioneer while simultaneously adjusting their bids 
based on resource prices, in such a way that a better 
system wide performance could be achieved.  
In this paper, we deal specifically with the resource 
allocation and scheduling problem associated with 
container terminals, but believe that our approach can 
be customized to solve other problems of similar 
structures.  The key result of this paper is to show, 
perhaps counter-intuitively (by experiments), that a 
better system-wide performance is not necessarily 
always achieved with each bidder adopting its best 
bidding strategy throughout the auction process. 
Instead, under various market conditions, convergence 
and better quality solutions can be achieved when 
agents take a negotiable stance in allowing the next-
best bidding strategies to be adopted while still reacting 
to price signals. 
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2. Literature review 
 
In recent years, there are a number of applications 
of auctions in solving distributed resource allocation 
and scheduling problems in a variety of domains. 
Kutanoglu and Wu [4] demonstrated the link between 
combinatorial auction and Lagrangean relaxation and 
use combinatorial auction to solve small-scale job shop 
scheduling problems. Other works include Wellman et 
al. [15], Goldberg et al. [3], Attanasio et al [1], Lau et 
al. [6], Liu and Zhao [7], Stokely et al. [12]. 
On strategic bidding, Wellman et al. [16] 
investigated a straightforward bidding policy and its 
variants to indicate that the efficacy of particular 
strategies depends critically on preferences and 
strategies of other agents, and that the strategy space is 
far too complex to yield to general game-theoretic 
analysis.  Sui and Leung [13] proposed an adaptive 
bidding strategy in a first price seal-bid combinatorial 
auction where the bidders can adjust the profit margin 
constantly accordingly to the bidding history. 
Our work has leveraged on the existing research 
findings of Lau et al. [6] by exploring the bidding 
strategies via an auction mechanism which solicits 
bidders’ change of bidding strategies in the hope that 
system wide performance will be enhanced. 
 
3. Notations and problem formulation 
 
The problem we deal with in this paper can be 
described as a multi-agent flowshop problem with 
special sequencing constraints between jobs in a given 
sequence, and is described as follows. There is a pool 
of limited renewable resource types (Prime Movers or 
PM, Yard Blocks and Yard Buckets) and there are 
multiple units of resources for each resource type. 
There is a set of job agents, each endowed with a list of 
jobs to be serviced in a sequence, where each job is 
performed as a series of operations and needs a 
combination of a single unit of each resource type for 
each operation. Each job corresponds to either loading 
a container from a yard bucket within a yard block to a 
quay crane (QC), or vice versa (called a discharge job). 
For simplicity, we take QCs to be the proxy for job 
agents (which is the same approach taken by Lau et al. 
[6]). The goal is to allocate resource timeslots to the 
job agents such that the sum of makespans of the job 
agents is minimized.  
To solve this problem by a Walrasian auction 
mechanism, the auctioneer will iteratively adjust the 
prices for each resource type in each time slot of the 
entire planning horizon; and in each iteration, the 
auction will begin with the announcement of the price 
vector to all bidders simultaneously.  In a conventional 
scheme, each bidder then generates a bid (i.e. a demand 
for each resource type in each time slot over the entire 
planning horizon) in response to the resource price 
vector. This bid is generated by a bid-generation 
algorithm which seeks to find the bid that minimizes 
the respective agent total cost function, which is 
defined as the sum of the makespan cost and the total 
cost of the bidded resource slots at the prevailing 
prices. Note that there is a tradeoff between these two 
cost components, since more resources will yield a 
shorter makespan but incur a higher resource cost, and 
hence the bid-generation algorithm is one that seeks the 
optimal balance.   A solution is called feasible if there 
are no resource conflicts.  
In this paper, we depart from the conventional 
auction scheme, and allow each bidder to have a finite 
and discrete set of bidding strategies; each strategy is 
associated with a bid generation algorithm. Some bid 
generation algorithms may perform better than others 
in terms of the agent total objective function. (The 
reason for having inferior bid generation algorithms 
will become clear later, but suffice here to say that they 
are required to break resource conflicts among agents, 
seen as compromises in negotiation terminology.)   
As noted earlier, there are 3 types of resources 
namely, PM, Yard Block and Bucket. A bidder may 
request a number of PMs in each time period in order 
to service its jobs.  In addition, it also needs to bid for 
the utilization of Yard Blocks and Buckets. (Interested 
readers familiar with this problem may like to note that 
the yard block resource acts as the proxy for the 
utilization of yard cranes, which we do not explicit bid 
for in this paper, unlike Lau et al. [6] for the reason that 
yard crane slots are consumed by multiple bidders 
simultaneously). Instead in our approach, a helper 
method performs the scheduling of yard cranes based 
on the yard block bids, and this schedule will provide a 
feedback to the auctioneer for the update of the prices 
of the yard block resources. 
We denote k to be the resource type index (PM, 
Block, Bucket) and the entire planning horizon is 
divided into T discrete time periods (aka time slots). 
The notations used in this paper are given as follows: 
• Xrikt denotes the demand quantity bidded by bidder 
i for resource k  in time period t during iteration r.  
• Crkt denotes the total supply (capacity) for resource 
k, in time period t during iteration r.  
• Drkt denotes the aggregate demand (of all agents) 
for resource k, in time period t during iteration r. 
• ωri denotes the bid generation strategy used by 
bidder i during iteration r. 
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4. Solution approach 
 
In our proposed approach, the strategy space for 
each bidder is denoted by Ω comprising of a number of 
bid generation strategies. Each strategy ω is associated 
with an algorithm which enables the bidder to generate 
bids and the corresponding total cost is denoted U(ω). 
Note that we drop the agent index for notational 
simplicity. The algorithms are designed in a way that 
one algorithm is cascaded with another so that the top 
algorithm always yields the best total cost. We term a 
strategy ω’ as smart and another strategy ω’’ as less 
smart if U(ω’) < U(ω’’). Let ω* denote the smartest 
bid generation strategy in Ω (where U(ω*) < U(ω) for 
any ω except itself). Note that a smart bid generation 
strategy tends to exploit cheap resources thereby 
potentially leading to resource contention with other 
agents assuming the other agents are also using smart 
strategies. Hence if all bidders adopt their respective 
smartest bid generation strategy throughout the auction 
process, it could be possible that those bidders will 
contend for resources with one another iteratively with 
possibly no feasible solution generated at the end of the 
auction process. Our intuition is that a less smart bid 
generation strategy may foster more cooperation and 
less competition, thereby leading to conflict resolution. 
Again it does not come without a cost. In the other 
extreme scenario where all bidders decide to use their 
less smart bid generation strategies throughout the 
auction process, we may obtain an undesirably large 
number of solutions, but none of them are good in 
quality as the resources utilization may not be high. 
Hence, the challenge is to be able to derive a 
negotiation mechanism embedded into the auctioneer 
logic that aims to persuade some bidders to concede 
and modify their bid generation strategies to inferior 
ones whenever necessary, so that a better system-wide 
solution can be obtained. We assume therefore that all 
agents are cooperative, i.e. willing to do so with the 
proper incentives set in place. Our proposed 
negotiation approach is based on a similar reward 
scheme proposed by Lau et al. [5] and Ramchurn et al. 
[9] and is outlined as follows. All bidders start with 
their respective optimal strategy ω*; the negotiation 
mechanism in the auctioneer side will solicit the change 
to an inferior strategy ω based on a certain criteria 
(details to be discussed later) and compensate those 
bidders who are willing to concede by an amount of 
credits which, if accumulated, could be used to reject 
future solicitations by surrendering some credits. 
  In the interest of space, we will skip over the 
discussion of bid generation and price adjustment for 
our problem. Interested readers may refer to [6] for 
details. In the following, we focus on presenting the 
key contribution of this work – the embedded 
negotiation mechanism. All bidders are assumed to 
start with the respective smartest bid generation 
strategy. A negotiation mechanism will be enabled if 
resource conflicts exist during the auction that cannot 
be resolved in the first λ (constant) number of 
iterations. Once the negotiation mechanism has been 
enabled, it will be constantly monitoring the ratio of the 
aggregate resource demands to the supply (i.e. D
r
kt 
/C
r
kt) – a large value that exceeds a threshold ftrigger 
suggests that the gap is caused by aggressive bidding 
behavior by some agents on resources for certain time 
periods. We measure bidder aggressiveness by the 
relative ratio of the amount of resource of type k at 
time t requested by a bidder i to the average demand 
(i.e. X
r
ikt/Ave_D
r
kt.). Note that this seemingly simplistic 
definition of aggressiveness may overkill those bidders 
who have persistent preference for resources in a 
particular time period (this persistent behavior will 
occur if some jobs can only be performed in a certain 
time period). However, such a stringent time constraint 
on the jobs largely reduces the effort required for the 
search algorithm as these jobs can only be performed in 
a certain time period. Even with a less smart bidding 
strategy, those bidders will still be able to retain 
desirable resource bids.  
fω’ (≥1) specifies the strategic-specific threshold to 
classify a bidder with its current strategy ω’ as an 
aggressive bidder. Hence, a large fω’ value implies that 
fewer bidders will be selected and requested to use 
their next-best bidding strategy. Note that fω’ is ∞ if ω’ 
is the least smart strategy in the strategy space, so that 
the bidder with the least smart strategy is never 
regarded as an aggressive bidder. The Negotiation Unit 
is responsible for identifying aggressive bidders. A 
contract O(ω’,ω’’) comprises a request for conceding 
from current strategy ω’ and adopting the next-best 
strategy ω’’ together with an associated reward 
M(ω’,ω’’). This reward will be offered in subsequent 
iterations to sustain agent’s interest to continue to bid 
with strategy ω’’. The number of credits given in each 
subsequent iteration is computed from the estimated 
performance gap between bidding strategies ω’ and 
ω’’, normalized by the average performance gap of all 
such (ω’, ω’’) pairs.  
On the bidder side, the credits C
r
i owned by a bidder 
are subject to a depreciation over time (similar to the 
concept of time value of money), which serves to 
discourage a bidder to use its credits at the later 
iterations in order to stabilize the overall bidding 
behavior. Bidders may choose to either accept the 
contract and receive M(ω’,ω’’) credits in each subsequent 
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iteration by adopting the next-best strategy ω’’ or reject 
the contract at the expense of surrendering a number of 
J(ω’,ω’’) credits. In our approach, we set J(ω’,ω’’) < M(ω’,ω’’) 
due to currency depreciation over time. If a bidder has 
enough credits, it may even choose to break the 
contract at any iteration to go back to the previous 
smart bidding strategy ω’ by surrendering E(ω’,ω’’) 
credits, and in our approach, we set E(ω’,ω’’) > M(ω’,ω’’) 
since a number of iterations would have elapsed before 
the bidder takes this course of action. The contracts can 
be cascaded on a single bidder in the sense that the 
rewards will be cumulatively added. Hence, a bidder on 
a contract O(ω’,ω’’) can be offered another contract 
O(ω’’,ω’’’) if it is identified again as an aggressive bidder 
in a subsequent iteration, in which case the credits 
given to the bidder becomes M(ω’,ω’’)+ M(ω’’,ω’’’) if the 
new contract O(ω’’,ω’’’) is accepted. In our approach, a 
bidder with multiple contracts should always break the 
latest contract first if there are sufficient credits. 
If at least one bidder changes its bid generation 
strategy, then the auctioneer will backtrack with a 
probability R by broadcasting the resource prices of 
current iteration to all the bidders without applying 
price adjustment. R is function of the frequency of 
demand/supply violations across all time periods so far, 
such that a low frequency leads a higher possibility to 
backtrack. The whole cycle (from submission of bids 
by bidders to the announcement of resource price by 
auctioneer) will be repeated iteratively until the 
stopping criteria are reached. 
 
Consider bidder’s current strategy to be ω’’.  
• Action 1: Bidder is not identified as an aggressive 
bidder so no new contract is offered, and bidder 
keeps the current strategy. 
• Action 2: Bidder is identified as an aggressive 
bidder and a contract O(ω’’,ω’’’)  is offered; bidder 
surrenders credits J(ω’’,ω’’’) to reject the contract and 
continue with existing strategy. 
• Action 3: Bidder is identified as an aggressive 
bidder and a contract O(ω’’,ω’’’)  is offered; however 
bidder possesses fewer number of credits than 
J(ω’’,ω’’). Hence, bidder accepts the contract and 
move to next-best strategy. 
• Action 4: Bidder have more than E(ω’,ω’’) credits, by 
surrendering E(ω’,ω’’) credits, it breaks the contract 
O(ω’,ω’’) and moves back to previous strategy ω’. 
 
5. Experimental results 
 
For simplicity, we consider only two bid generation 
strategies for each bidder (Simulated Annealing or SA, 
which is the smart strategy, and Relax-and-Repair or 
R&R, the next-best or inferior one). 
Recall that each agent bids for the right to use 
various resource types in different time periods. The 
length of each time period is set to half an hour in our 
experiment. To model the scheduling of jobs more 
precisely, we further divide each time period into 60 
time units, each with length of 0.5 minutes. We model 
the QC, PM, YC processing times as well as the YC 
gantry time with real data obtained from a container 
terminal operator. The experiment is conducted with a 
variety of test cases: under normal resource supply 
conditions as well as those under tight resource 
conditions by scaling down resource capacity from 
those normal test cases. For the negotiation mechanism, 
we set the value of λ to 5, ftrigger to 1.05, fSA to 1, fR&R to 
∞. All experiments were performed on four Pentium-4 
3.0GHz processors each with 2 GB RAM. 
First, we present results on system wide 
performance. We compare our approach with three 
others – a centralized exact approach (adapted from 
Pritsker et al. [8]) solved using the CPLEX 9.0 C++ 
callable library, as well as two standard auction 
approaches where agents adopt specific bidding 
strategies. In the tables below, the respective approach 
is labeled with the bidding strategies used (being R&R 
or SA). Our approach is labeled as “Negotiated”.   
As the centralized approach is computationally 
intensive, we first experimented on test cases of small 
problem size (4 bidders, each with 20 jobs). Our results 
show that for small problem size, in all 5 test scenarios, 
our approach on average gives the best system-wide 
performance (i.e. sum of agent makespans) among 
various auction approaches. The exact mathematical 
model provides the optimal solution, which on average 
is about 20% better than results obtained using auctions 
(the loss of efficiency is to be expected, as shown in 
other papers in the literature). However, the 
computational time taken is prohibitively large and has 
big variance among the test cases. Even for a small 
instance, the computation time on average can take up 
to 7 hours for one test run, whereas all auction 
approaches on average take less than 20 seconds to 
complete (where each agent runs on one of the four 
PCs). 
 For larger problems, we compare the performance of 
the 3 auction approaches. To ensure fair comparison of 
performance against run time, we let each auction 
process run for 200 iterations. These test cases have up 
to 30 bidders, each of which has a number of load and 
discharge jobs ranging from 90 and 120. From the 
experiment results, we may observe our approach 
yields the best system-wide performance on average 
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within a reasonable computational budget, compared to 
the other standard auction approaches that adopted a 
single bidding strategy throughout the auction.   
What is perhaps more interesting is the study on the 
convergence of various auction schemes on two 
specific large tight resource cases (with 20% reduction 
of the normal resource capacity). Experimental results 
show that the SA approach produces no feasible 
solution in both test cases, whereas the R&R and 
Negotiated approaches are still able to give solutions in 
both test cases. The best solution and number of 
feasible solutions of both the R&R and Negotiated 
approaches are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below. 
For Test Case 2, the feasible solution is given by the 
Negotiated approach at iteration 53 and by R&R at 
iteration 72. The feasible solutions for Test Case 1 are 
traced against the iterations in Figure 1.  Note that each 
point in the diagram indicates the time when a feasible 
solution is found. We observe that in both test cases, 
our approach finds a feasible solution in an earlier 
iteration compared with the R&R approach, and the 
quality of the feasible solutions are better than those 
obtained by R&R, even though R&R yields a greater 
number of feasible solutions.   
 
Table 1. System-wide performance (makespan) 
comparison of R&R and SA 
 R&R Negotiated 
Test Case 1 279.5 274.5 
Test Case 2 240.5 223.9 
Note: all makespans measured in terms of number of minutes 
 
Table 2. Number of feasible solutions obtained by 
various approaches 
 R&R SA Negotiated 
Test Case 1 16 0 6 
Test Case 2 1 0 1 
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Figure 1. Solution plot for test case 1 
 
6. Conclusion 
It is perhaps apt to end the paper with a philosophic 
note from Robert Axelrod’s remarkable book on the 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma – that “in a non-zero sum 
setting, it does not always pay to be so clever… you 
benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is 
to encourage that cooperation.”
1
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